


**Secret**



DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE

# Intelligence Memorandum

*Foreign Shipping to North Vietnam  
During January 1968*

**Secret**


ER IM 68-29

March 1968

Copy **Nº**

**161**

25X1



SECRET

Foreword

The data in this memorandum are preliminary and subject to modification as additional information becomes available. Significant changes may occur in ship arrivals and cargoes from Communist China and, to a lesser extent, in cargoes carried by ships of the Free World. Soviet and Eastern European ship arrivals and cargoes and Free World arrivals are not likely to be changed significantly. To reflect changes in previous reports, a table showing monthly arrivals, by flag, is included in this memorandum. Weights of cargoes are expressed in metric tons.

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
 Directorate of Intelligence  
 March 1968

## INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Foreign Shipping to North Vietnam  
During January 1968

Summary

Ship arrivals and seaborne imports reached record highs in North Vietnam during January. Forty-six foreign ships arrived with 196,900 tons of imports aboard. A buildup of congestion at Haiphong, which became evident in January, probably will be reflected in an increased average layover time for ships departing in February.

Arrivals of both Communist and Free World ships in January were well above average monthly levels for 1967, as shown in Tables 1 and 2, Figure 1, and the following tabulation:

<u>Flag</u>	<u>December 1967</u>	<u>January 1968</u>	<u>Monthly Average 1967</u>
<i>Total</i>	32	46	32.2
Communist countries	<u>22</u>	<u>36</u>	<u>25.7</u>
USSR	16	20	15.1
Eastern Europe	1	3	2.4
Communist China	5	11	8.1
Cuba		2	0.1
Free World	<u>10</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>6.5</u>
United Kingdom	9	9	5.6
Other	1	1	0.9

*Note: This memorandum was produced by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Economic Research and information on ship arrivals was coordinated with the Naval Intelligence Command.*

SECRET

25X1

## SECRET

In January, identified seaborne imports in all major commodity categories were well above those of December as well as being above the monthly averages for 1965-67, as shown in the tabulation below:

	Thousand Tons				
	December 1967	January 1968	Monthly Average		
			1965	1966	1967
<i>Total imports a/</i>	130.2	196.9	58.1	77.1	112.6
Bulk food	53.9	59.8	9.9	6.5	37.7
Fertilizer	13.7	25.4	13.5	18.9	12.5
Petroleum	28.1	34.5	14.2	16.7	20.5
Timber		3.0	1.2	1.1	1.1
Miscellaneous and general cargo	34.5	74.3	19.3	33.9	40.8

*a. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.*

Imports of miscellaneous and general cargoes set a new record, and imports of bulk food and petroleum were close to previous records. Soviet ships carried 35 percent of the imports; Chinese ships, 25 percent; Free World ships, 23 percent; and Eastern European and Cuban ships, 17 percent. No seaborne imports of arms or ammunition were detected. An SA-2 missile cannister appeared in photography of Haiphong on 6 January. Its proximity to the main railroad yard suggests, however, that it may have been brought in by rail for transshipment by truck to the SAM site southeast of the city. Identified seaborne exports increased slightly from their December level to 43,900 tons but were below the monthly average for 1967.

SECRET


Figure 1

# North Vietnam: Foreign-Flag Ship Arrivals

ARRIVALS PER MONTH

MONTHLY AVERAGES

25



69653 2-68 CIA

SECRET

The Situation in Haiphong

1. Record levels of ship arrivals and imports at Haiphong during January led to a buildup of port congestion. The average daily number of dry cargo ships\* in port rose from 13 in December to 21 in January, compared with an average of 25 and 22 ships during June and July 1967, respectively, when congestion was at its highest. The congestion in January would have been more serious if it were not for the increased availability and use of lighters in discharging cargo, especially from ships at anchor. It is estimated that on a typical day in January, eight dry cargo ships were discharging cargoes at berths alongside the wharves, four were discharging cargoes into lighters while at anchor, and nine were at anchor waiting to discharge.\*\* During October through December, an average of only two to three ships were idle at any one time. The increase in the number of idle ships was not reflected in layover times for ships that departed from Haiphong in January, which averaged the same as in December -- 15 days. Layover times for departing ships will be significantly higher in February, however, and in succeeding months, too, if imports remain at high levels.

2. Attempts to increase discharge rates at Haiphong during January were apparently hampered by an inability to make additional stevedores available. Discharge rates, nevertheless, were apparently increased somewhat during the month as evidenced by an increase in the accumulation of cargoes in open storage. This accumulation appeared to be greater than that observed at the beginning of October after US airstrikes on the bridges

---

\* Tankers are excluded from this count because they do not compete with dry cargo ships for berthing space or cargo-handling equipment.

\*\* During 1967 and in January 1968, the berths alongside the wharves in Haiphong could accommodate approximately eight ships, depending on their size. The number of ships that can be worked in addition to those at berths depends largely on the availability of stevedores and lighters for discharging ships at anchor. During 1967 a minimum of 170 lighters and other waterborne craft were added to North Vietnam's fleet.

SECRET

SECRET

leading out of Haiphong temporarily disrupted clearance of the port and during the period of high ship congestion in mid-1967.

3. There was no evidence of a worsening of the silting problem in Haiphong harbor during January, but an increased number of dry cargo ships was observed lightering in the lower Bach Dang anchorage (see Figure 2). Some of this lightering activity may have been undertaken to increase the discharge capacity of the port, but in other cases it probably was done to reduce the draft of ships so they could pass through the Maritime Canal to the main wharf area.\*

4. Construction work to extend the western end of the Chamber of Commerce Wharves in Haiphong by about 450 feet continued during January. Many pilings were in place and preparations were under way for laying the decking (see Figure 3). This extension will enable the port to berth one additional dry cargo ship of about 8,000 DWT and should increase the discharge capacity of the port.

#### Communist Shipping

5. The 36 Communist ships that arrived in North Vietnam during January delivered 77 percent of North Vietnam's seaborne imports. This represents the largest number of Communist-flag arrivals since March 1967 and far exceeds the monthly average in 1967.


6. Soviet ships carried 35 percent of North Vietnam's seaborne imports in January. Of the 20 Soviet ships that arrived, six were tankers. The tankers, all small ships of the 3,360 GRT *Drogobych* class, came directly from Vladivostok in the Soviet Far East. The 14 Soviet dry cargo ships included 10 from Vladivostok (eight with flour and two with general cargo), two from Cambodia (one with timber

\* Most dry cargo ships that are to be unloaded in the Haiphong wharf area anchor first at the Bach Dang anchorage to await their turn for a berth. When they receive a berth they transit the Maritime Canal, which separates the Cam Nam Trieu approach channel from the Cua Cam River.

SECRET



## NORTH VIETNAM: Maritime Ports, Anchorages, and Shipping Channels



**Page Denied**

SECRET

and the other with some general cargo), and two from the Black Sea (both with fertilizer and general cargo and one with additional cargo of drummed petroleum). One of the dry cargo ships, the *Pereslavyi Zaleskiy*, which arrived in Haiphong on 2 January, was apparently damaged by US delayed-action bombs on 4 January while anchored in the Cua Cam River upstream from the main wharf area. It was subsequently towed to a wharf for the removal of its cargo of flour. On 16 January it departed for the Soviet Far East under tow. The USSR alleged that the main engines were knocked out by the bomb damage, but it was rumored in Haiphong that the engines had broken down prior to the bombing and were under repair. Ten Soviet dry cargo ships departed in January: five with coal for Japan and five in ballast (two for Vladivostok and one each for Thailand, Singapore, and Australia). Five Soviet tankers departed in ballast for Vladivostok.

7. Chinese ships carried 25 percent of North Vietnam's seaborne imports in January. Nine of the 11 Chinese ships that arrived came directly from China: four carried rice, three general cargo, and two both general cargo and foodstuffs. The other two Chinese ships arrived from Eastern Europe: one delivered fertilizer from Bulgaria and general cargo from Rumania, and the other delivered drummed petroleum and general cargo from Rumania. Nine Chinese ships departed from North Vietnam -- eight bound for China (five with coal, one with general cargo, and two in ballast) and one bound for China and Eastern European ports (with general cargo).

8. The three Eastern European ships that called during January were all Polish-flag ships. Two of these ships, both owned by Chipolbrok (the Chinese-Polish Shipbrokers' Company), delivered general cargo and meat from Eastern European ports. The third ship, a cargo liner of the Polish Ocean Lines, delivered mostly general cargo from Eastern Europe. The only Eastern European ship that departed in January, also a Polish-flag ship, sailed in ballast for China. It had encountered a delay of several weeks, apparently to enable a Chinese ship to discharge its cargo first.

SECRET

SECRET

9. The two Cuban ships that called during January were the first since May 1967. One discharged a cargo of sugar from Cuba and the other, which had arrived from North Korea, departed for China after nine days at anchor, apparently without discharging any cargo.

#### Free World Shipping

10. Ten Free World ships arrived in North Vietnam during January, the same number as in December, but significantly more than the monthly average in 1967. They delivered 23 percent of all seaborne imports. Nine of the 10 were Hong Kong-owned British-flag ships\* (seven chartered to Communist China and two to North Vietnam); the other was a Cypriot-flag ship chartered to North Vietnam. The British-flag ships included eight dry cargo ships (five with general cargo, two with fertilizer and general cargo, and one with corn and pork) and one tanker, the *Taipeieng*,\*\* which delivered petroleum. The Cypriot-flag ships delivered oil drums from Hong Kong. Six Free World ships departed from North Vietnam in January: five British-flag ships in ballast and one Cypriot-flag with general cargo for Hong Kong.

#### Cargoes

11. Identified seaborne imports reached a record high of 196,900 tons in January (see Table 3), 66,700 tons more than in December and 49,500 tons more than the previous high in May 1967. Imports of bulk foods and petroleum were close to previous records, miscellaneous and general cargoes set a new record, and fertilizer imports were at their highest level since March 1967.

12. Seaborne imports of bulk foods were 59,800 tons in January, 59 percent above the monthly average in 1967. All but 2,800 tons arrived on Communist ships: 26,600 tons (mostly flour) on Soviet ships, 18,300 tons (largely rice) on Chinese ships, 11,300 tons (sugar) on a Cuban ship, and 800 tons (meat and coconut oil) on Polish ships (from

\* These ships are owned by firms believed to be under the control of Communist China.

\*\* The *Taipeieng* has made seven separate deliveries of petroleum to North Vietnam from China since January 1967.

SECRET

SECRET

Rumania and Singapore). Sugar imports from Cuba were the first since May 1967.

13. During January, petroleum imports by sea increased for the fourth successive month to 34,500 tons, close to the May 1967 high of 35,700 tons. In addition to these direct deliveries, the USSR shipped 21,200 tons of petroleum to China on North Vietnamese account in January; in December the USSR shipped 10,600 tons to China under a similar arrangement. This petroleum presumably will be stored in China and forwarded to North Vietnam overland or by ship at a later date. The unusually large volume of both direct and indirect deliveries to North Vietnam in January may be a precautionary measure in the event of the closure of Haiphong, or it may reflect an increase in consumption.

14. The 24,200 tons of bulk petroleum that arrived in North Vietnam from the USSR in January came on Soviet tankers from Vladivostok.\* The remaining 7,000 tons came from China on a Chinese-chartered British-flag tanker. In addition, about 3,300 tons of drummed petroleum arrived from the Black Sea on Soviet and Chinese dry cargo ships.

15. In January a Soviet ship delivered the first shipment of timber (3,000 tons) from Cambodia since August 1967. Imports of timber, almost all of which come from Cambodia, have been low for several years, averaging 1,200 tons a month in 1965 and 1,100 tons a month in 1966 and 1967.

16. Imports of fertilizer rose to 25,400 tons in January, twice the monthly average in 1967. Whereas 65 percent of fertilizer deliveries in 1967 originated in the USSR, only 31 percent originated there in January. The remainder came from China, 28 percent; North Korea, 25 percent; and Bulgaria, 16 percent.

17. Imports of miscellaneous and general cargo reached a new monthly high of 74,300 tons in January,

---

\* The layover times for these small Soviet tankers were unusually low, about five days each, compared with an average of about nine days for similar tankers in 1967. Increased lightering activity in the Song Bach Dang Anchorage, where tankers usually discharge their cargo, probably was responsible for the reduced turnaround times.

SECRET

SECRET

82 percent above the monthly average in 1967. The previous peak month was November 1967, when 63,800 tons were delivered. Most of the deliveries were from Communist countries -- the USSR, 6,400 tons; Eastern Europe, 26,100 tons; North Korea, 2,400 tons; and China, 37,500 tons. Identified miscellaneous and general cargoes, about one-half of the total, consisted of construction equipment and materials, electrical equipment, spare parts, vehicles, lightering craft, and cement.

18. No seaborne imports of arms or ammunition were detected in January. Photography of 6 January revealed a probable SA-2 missile cannister in an uncovered wooden crate in an open storage area near the main Haiphong railroad yard (located about one-quarter of a mile from the wharves). A week later the cannister was gone. There is no evidence as to how this crate entered Haiphong. Its proximity to the rail yard, however, suggests that it might have been delivered by rail and off-loaded for transshipment by truck to the SAM site southeast of Haiphong near the Cat Bi Airfield. Rail delivery was possible as there is evidence that the bypass around the bombed out railroad bridge linking the railroad yard with the line to Hanoi began functioning at the end of December.

19. Identified seaborne exports totaled 43,900 tons in January (see Table 4), a slight increase over the December volume, but still far below monthly averages during the years 1965-67, as shown in the tabulation below:

	Thousand Tons	
	<u>Total Exports</u>	<u>Coal Exports</u>
January 1968	43.9	38.9
1967 monthly average	47.7	36.0
1966 monthly average	97.3	78.2
1965 monthly average	142.8	95.8

The level of exports in January, nevertheless, indicates a steady improvement since September 1967, when coal exports fell to a record low of 9,300 tons as the result of heavy airstrikes on processing facilities at Cam Pha. Partial restoration of these

SECRET

SECRET

facilities along with increased exports from Hon Gay has enabled the North Vietnamese to partly restore their coal exports. Coal exports of 38,900 tons in January, however, were still well below average monthly exports of 50,800 tons during the first half of 1967. Although no apatite has been exported by sea since July 1966, production is still taking place at the Lao Cai mines. There are indications that apatite has been shipped by rail from Lao Cai to China since the railroad in Yunnan Province was linked to China's main rail network by a new line in 1966. No seaborne exports of cement or pig iron were detected in January.

SECRET

Table 1

North Vietnam: Foreign-Flag Ship Arrivals a/  
December 1967, January 1968, and Monthly Average 1967

Flag	December 1967		January 1968		Monthly Average 1967	
	Arrivals	Percent	Arrivals	Percent	Arrivals	Percent
<i>Total</i>	<i>32</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>46</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>32.2</i>	<i>100.0</i>
Communist countries	<u>22</u>	<u>68.8</u>	<u>36</u>	<u>78.3</u>	<u>25.7</u>	<u>79.8</u>
USSR	16	50.0	20	43.5	15.1	46.9
Eastern Europe	1	3.1	3	6.5	2.4	7.5
Albania					0.1	0.3
Bulgaria					0.3	0.9
Poland	1	3.1	3	6.5	2.0	6.2
Communist China	5	15.6	11	23.9	8.1	25.2
Cuba			2	4.3	0.1	0.3
Free World	<u>10</u>	<u>31.2</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>21.7</u>	<u>6.5</u>	<u>20.2</u>
Cyprus			1	2.2	0.4	1.2
Italy					0.2	0.6
Lebanon	1	3.1			0.1	0.3
Malta					0.2	0.6
United Kingdom	9	28.1	9	19.6	5.6	17.4

a. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.

SECRET  
- 10 -

SECRET



Table 2

North Vietnam: Tonnage of Foreign-Flag Ship Arrivals a/  
December 1967, January 1968, and Monthly Average 1967

Flag	December 1967		January 1968		Monthly Average 1967	
	Arrivals	Thousand Gross Register Tons	Arrivals	Thousand Gross Register Tons	Arrivals	Thousand Gross Register Tons
<i>Total</i>	<i>32</i>	<i>165.1</i>	<i>46</i>	<i>233.4</i>	<i>32</i>	<i>160.3</i>
Communist countries	<u>22</u>	<u>109.8</u>	<u>36</u>	<u>184.4</u>	<u>26</u>	<u>127.3</u>
USSR	16	82.8	20	87.1	15	77.3
Eastern Europe	1	7.1	3	23.6	2	18.6
Communist China	5	20.0	11	54.9	8	30.5
Cuba			2	18.8	Negl.	0.8
Free World	<u>10</u>	<u>55.3</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>49.0</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>33.0</u>

a. The aggregate tonnage of ships calling does not necessarily reflect the actual volume of cargoes moving into and out of North Vietnam, but is of value as an indicator of relative changes in the volume of shipping. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.

SECRET  
- 11 -

SECRET

Table 3

North Vietnam: Identified Imports Carried on Foreign-Flag Ships a/  
January 1968, December 1967, and Monthly Average 1967

Thousand Metric Tons

Flag	January 1968						December 1967	Monthly Average 1967
	Food-stuffs	Fertilizer	Petroleum	Timber	Miscellaneous	Total		
<i>Total</i>	<i>59.8</i>	<i>25.4</i>	<i>34.5</i>	<i>3.0</i>	<i>74.3</i>	<i>196.9</i>	<i>130.2</i>	<i>112.6</i>
Communist countries	<u>57.0</u>	<u>11.8</u>	<u>27.5</u>	<u>3.0</u>	<u>52.5</u>	<u>151.8</u>	<u>83.4</u>	<u>85.1</u>
USSR	26.6	7.8	25.2	3.0	6.4	69.1	59.5	55.6
Eastern Europe	0.8				21.9	22.7	6.5	8.4
Communist China	18.3	4.0	2.2		24.3	48.8	17.4	20.1
Cuba	11.3					11.3		1.0
Free World	<u>2.8</u>	<u>13.5</u>	<u>7.0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>21.7</u>	<u>45.1</u>	<u>46.8</u>	<u>27.5</u>

*a. Identified imports include some estimates of bulk cargoes, using methods which have proved to be highly reliable. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.*

SECRET  
- 12 -

SECRET

Table 4

North Vietnam: Identified Exports Carried on Foreign-Flag Ships a/  
January 1968, December 1967, and Monthly Average 1967

Flag	January 1968			December 1967	Monthly Average 1967
	Coal	Miscellaneous	Total		
<i>Total</i>	38.9	5.0	43.9	41.4	47.7
Communist countries	38.9	3.4	42.2	23.2	40.1
USSR	19.9		19.9	12.2	21.0
Eastern Europe				1.4	4.7
Communist China	19.0	3.4	22.3	9.5	14.0
Cuba					0.5
Free World	0	1.7	1.7	18.2	7.6

a. Identified exports include some estimates of bulk cargoes, using methods which have proved to be highly reliable. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.

**Secret**

25X1

**Secret**